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THE AUTOMATED ADMINSTRATIVE STATE: 
A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY 
 
Ryan Calo* & Danielle Keats Citron** 
 
 
The legitimacy of the administrative state is premised on our faith in agency 
expertise. Despite their extra-constitutional structure, administrative agencies 
have been on firm footing for a long time in reverence to their critical role in 
governing a complex, evolving society. They are delegated enormous power 
because they respond expertly and nimbly to evolving conditions.  
 
In recent decades, state and federal agencies have embraced a novel mode of 
operation: automation. Agencies rely more and more on software and algorithms 
in carrying out their delegated responsibilities. The automated administrative 
state, however, is demonstrably riddled with concerns. Legal challenges regarding 
the denial of benefits and rights—from travel to disability—have revealed a 
pernicious pattern of bizarre and unintelligible outcomes.  
 
Scholarship to date has explored the pitfalls of automation with a particular frame, 
asking how we might ensure that automation honors existing legal commitments 
such as due process. Missing from the conversation are broader, structural 
critiques of the legitimacy of agencies that automate. Automation throws away the 
expertise and nimbleness that justify the administrative state, undermining the very 
case for the existence and authority of agencies.  
 
Yet the answer is not to deny agencies access to technology. This article points 
toward a positive vision of the administrative state that adopts tools only when 




In 2016, the Arkansas Department of Human Services decided to make 
a change. Rather than having a nurse visit disabled residents at home to 
assess their care needs, the agency hired a software company to build an 
algorithm that would automate the determination. The agency hoped to save 
money. Instead, administrators found themselves in federal court. 
 
 
* Lane Powell and D. Wayne Gittinger Associate Professor of Law; Associate 
Professor (by courtesy), Allen School for Computer Science and Engineering; and 
Associate Professor (by courtesy), Information School, University of Washington.  
** Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law; Vice President, Cyber Civil 
Rights Initiative; and 2019 MacArthur Fellow. 
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Arkansas’ new system proved cruel and illogical. The Kafkaesque 
system decreased the home care of an amputee because he had “no foot 
problems.”1 As a result of the automated system’s dysfunction, severely 
disabled Medicaid recipients were left alone without access to food, toilet, 
and medicine for hours on end. Nearly half of Arkansas Medicaid recipients 
were negatively affected.2 Obtaining relief from the software-based 
outcome was all but impossible.3 
 
A federal court enjoined the state agency from using the automated 
system after a damning narrative emerged. Agency officials admitted they 
did not know how the system worked.4 The authors of the algorithm and the 
software vendors were similarly unable, or unwilling, to provide an 
explanation.5 On cross-examination in open court, the agency and its 
partners admitted not only that they failed to detect the system errors that 
the litigants uncovered, but that in many instances they lacked the expertise 
necessary to do so.6  
 
Administrative agencies are a constitutional anomaly. They are 
permitted to exist, we are told, because the world is complicated and 
requires expertise and discretion beyond the capacity of legislatures.7 And 
yet more and more agency officials are admitting—sometimes in open 
court—that they possess neither. Agencies are invested with governing 
authority (over the objections of many) due to their unique capabilities and 
knowledge and now they are turning that authority to machines. 
 
 
1 Kevin De Liban, “Algorithm Absurdities—RUGs as Implemented in Arkansas,” 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1t2ACNXr7D8JBSLja7F3UC3zkl_qu-xg7., on file 
with the authors).  
2 Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV-17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018); 
see Ark. Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 
2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). 
3 Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE 
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-
cerebral-palsy. 
4 Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016). 
5 Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Testimony of Brant Fries, Jacobs v. Gillespie, 
No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016). 
6 Id. 
7 See infra, Part II.A. 
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Since the turn of the millennium, inadequately resourced federal and 
state agencies have turned to automation for a variety of reasons but notably 
to contain costs.8 A little over a decade ago, the problems associated with 
automating public-benefits determinations came into view. In the public 
benefits arena, programmers embedded erroneous rules into the systems, 
more often by mistake or inattention.9 Systems cut, denied, or terminated 
individuals’ benefits without explanation in violation of due process 
guarantees.10  
 
Challenging automated decisions was difficult because systems lacked 
audit trails that could help excavate the reason behind the decisions.11 
Judicial review had limited value in light of the strong psychological 
tendency to defer to a computer’s findings. These problems affected 
hundreds of thousands of people (often the most vulnerable), wasted 
hundreds of millions of dollars, and produced expensive litigation. Agencies 
spent millions to purchase automated systems. And they spent millions 
more to fix the problems those systems created.12 
 
Despite these concerns, agencies have continued to adopt—often via 
third-party vendors—automated systems that defy explanation even by their 
creators. New York officials are still using the defective algorithm litigated 
in Arkansas despite its clear deficiencies.13 Idaho’s health and welfare 
 
8 As of 2004, 52 of 125 federal agencies surveyed by the Government Accountability 
Office reported the use of data mining, defined as “as the application of database 
technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis and modeling—to uncover hidden 
patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for the prediction of 
future results.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-548, DATA MINING: 
FEDERAL EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES 1 (2004). Data mining has its perils but 
differs from automation. We further distinguish the use of modeling for planning versus the 
automatization of agency tasks in Part IV. 
9 For instance, the Colorado Benefits Management System had been making decisions 
using over 900 rules that had never been subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
CMBS terminated Medicaid of breast cancer patients based on income and asset limits 
unauthorized by federal or state law, required eligibility workers to ask applicants if they 
were “beggars” despite the absence of any legal mandate to do so, denied food stamps to 
individuals with prior drug convictions in violation of Colorado law. Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1253, 1276–77 (2008). 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 1253, 1276–77 (2008). 
12 Id. 
13 Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE 
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018 9:00 AM), 
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agency commissioned its own budget software tool to allocate the number 
of hours of home care for disabled Medicaid recipients.14 That algorithmic 
tool also drastically cut individuals’ home care hours without meaningful 
explanation and faced challenge in court. 
 
The pattern is hardly limited to health administration. Stage agencies 
have deployed algorithms and software to evaluate public school teachers in 
Texas, to assess and terminate unemployment benefits in Michigan, and to 
evaluate the risks posed by criminal defendants in D.C., Wisconsin, and 
elsewhere.15  
 
Nor is the pattern limited to the states. The Department of Homeland 
Security has long deployed an algorithmic system—the so-called No Fly 
List—to try to prevent terrorists from traveling. This data-matching 
program has misidentified many individuals, in part because it uses crude 
algorithms that could not distinguish between similar names. Thousands of 
people got caught in the dragnet, including government officials, military 
veterans, and toddlers.16 The U.S. government would not say if one was on 
the list and provided no explanation for no-fly decisions.  
 
An increasingly wide variety of federal agencies leverage algorithms 
and automation in carrying out their statutorily committed duties. The IRS, 
SEC, U.S. Postal Service, and myriad other federal agencies are using 
machines in one manner or another.17 A recent report nearly half of all 
agencies use, or are investigating the use of, artificial intelligence.18 Just last 




14 K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp.3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016). 
15 Lecher, supra note, at. 
16 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 261 (2017). 
17 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2017). For a recent and 
thorough review of federal use of algorithms, see David Freeman Engstrom et al., 
Government by Algorithm: Artificial Intelligence in Federal Administrative Agencies 
(2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/ACUS-AI-
Report.pdf/. 
18 Id., at 15-20 (“[C]ontrary to popular perceptions presuming government agencies 
uniformly rely on antiquated systems and procedures, many agencies have in fact 
experimented with [artificial intelligence or machine learning].” 
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potential efficiencies of AI.19  
 
Agencies are listening. A January 2019 request for proposals from the 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services sought a contract to 
coordinate artificial intelligence procurement, descripting the contract as 
“the next logical step to integrating [intelligence automation and artificial 
intelligence] into all phases of government operations.”20 
 
The turn toward automation in recent decades has not gone 
unchallenged. Scholars have repeatedly pushed back against governmental 
use of software and algorithms to arrive at decisions and goals previously 
carried out by people. “The human race’s rapid development of computer 
technology,” observed Paul Schwartz thirty years ago in a related context, 
“has not been matched by a requisite growth in the ability to control these 
new machines.”21 In 2008, one of us (Citron) offered an extensive 
framework for evaluating and responding to agency reliance on 
technology.22 In recent years this discourse has burgeoned into a full-blown 
literature spanning multiple disciplines.23  
 
Yet the challenges posed to the automated administrative state to date 
tend to proceed from a very specific frame: the problem of automation 
arises when a machine has taken over a task previously committed to a 
human such that guarantees of transparency, accountability, and due process 
fall away.24 This frame follows a tendency in law and technology generally 
to focus on how machines that substitute for humans undermine certain 
values or rights. The discussion of how best to restore due process in light 
 
19 Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence, Exec. Order No. 13,859, 
84 Fed. Reg. 3,967 (Feb. 11, 2019). 
20 [add cite], cited in, Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as 
Policy: Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781 
(2019). 
21 Paul Schwartz, Data Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the 
American Legal Response to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (1992). 
22 See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 
1301–13 (2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
355, 371–81 (2008).  
23 See infra, Part I.  
24 An important, related literature examines the ways automation exacerbates 
inequality or entrenches bias. See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW 
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 180-88 (2018); Solon Barocas 
& Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. LAW REV. 671 (2016).  
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of computer-driven decision-making is an example. The debate around 
liability for driverless cars is another. 
 
The 2017 article Accountable Algorithms is illustrative of the literature. 
“Important decisions that were historically made by people are now made 
by computer systems,” the authors write, and “accountability mechanisms 
and legal standards that govern decision processes have not kept pace with 
technology.”25 In other words, many consequential government decisions 
were once made by people, attended by accountability mechanisms suited to 
people. Now that machines make these decisions, law or technology must 
change to restore the rights and values afforded individuals under the 
previous arrangement. The authors suggest legal and technical mechanisms 
to restore the status quo ex ante. Recently, some scholars and activists have 
called for a ban or moratorium on the use of automation unless or until such 
issues can be addressed.26 
 
We have participated in the project of restoring rights and values 
displaced by technology for some time. The aim of this article is to 
foreground a distinct question: whether automation by agencies threatens to 
erode long-standing justifications for having agencies at all. 
 
On the standard account, legislatures delegate authority to agencies 
because they must. The Constitution commits to Congress the authority to 
make laws; the world has become so complex and dynamic, however, that 
Congress must delegate its authority to administrative agencies. The 
famously “functionalist” rationale for delegation rests on the affordances of 
bureaucracies, particularly their ability to accrue expertise and the prospect 
 
25 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 636 (2017). 
26 See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, A Rule of Persons, Not Machines: The Limits of Legal 
Automation, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 6, 44–54 (2019) (suggesting that automation in the 
legal field should be limited to technology that complements, rather than replaces, an 
attorney’s skills); Nathan Sheard, The Fight Against Government Face Surveillance: 2019 
Year in Review, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 31, 2019), 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2019/12/year-fight-against-government-face-surveillance 
(discussing local and state bans on the use of facial recognition technology and current 
concerns related to ongoing use by the FBI and its state and federal partners); Jane Wester, 
NY State Senate Bill Would Ban Police Use of Facial Recognition Technology, N.Y.L.J. 
(Jan. 27, 2020, 2:36 PM),  https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/01/27/ny-state-
senate-bill-would-ban-police-use-of-facial-recognition-technology/ (describing a proposed 
N.Y. State Senate bill which would prohibit law enforcement from using facial recognition 
and some other biometric surveillance tools and “create a task force to examine how to 
regulate biometric technology in the future”). 
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of flexible and nimble responses to complex problems.27 Courts bless this 
extra-Constitutional arrangement and defer to agency decision-making for 
very similar reasons.28  
 
Mounting evidence suggests that agencies are turning to systems in 
which they hold no expertise, and which foreclose discretion, individuation, 
and reason-giving almost entirely. The automated administrative state is 
less and less the imperfect compromise between the text of the Constitution 
and the realities of contemporary governance. At some point, the trend 
toward throwing away expertise, discretion, and flexibility with both hands 
strains the very rationale for creating and maintaining an administrative 
state.29 This is especially true where, as often, the very same processes of 
automation also frustrate the guardrails put in place by Congress and the 
courts to ensure agency accountability.  
 
The question we ask in this article is not how to restore the status quo ex 
ante given that machines have supplanted people. We ask instead whether 
technology obligates a fundamental reexamination of why Congress is 
permitted to hand off power to agencies in the first place.  
 
The new direction we advocate is critical but ultimately constructive. 
We do not recommend the dissolution of the administrative state, which has 
turned to automation largely in response to a hostile political economy. Nor 
do we hope to foreclose the use of technology by state or federal agencies. 
Our ultimate recommendation is that agencies should consciously select 
technology to the extent its new affordances enhance, rather than 
undermine, the rationale that underpins the administrative state. This would 
be so even absent a looming legitimacy crisis. We observe that, far from 
demand a return to the status quo, new technology invites us to heighten 
and extend our expectations of what government can offer its citizens. Such 
examples exist in the literature and media; we believe they deserve greater 
attention and collect them here. 
 
27 See Edward H. Stiglitz, Delegating for Trust, 166 PA. L. REV. 633, 635 (2018) 
(“Looking to judicial opinions or academic writing, the dominant explanation of and 
justification for the administrative state is based on agencies’ expertise and expansive 
rulemaking and adjudicatory capacities.”). See also infra, Part II.A. 
28 See Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835 (1986). 
(referencing “certain ideas about government and knowledge … which would become 
standard justifications for administrative government”). See also infra, Part II.A. 
29 Said another way, why wouldn’t a Congress favorable to automation simply contract 
directly with software providers to carry out its legislative will? 
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Our argument proceeds as follows. Part I traces the legal literature 
around agency automation to date, indicating certain limitations in the 
approach scholars (including us) have taken in framing the issues. Parts II 
and III advance the novel critique that, taken to its logical conclusion, 
agency automation undermines not only constitutional and administrative 
procedural guarantees, but the very justification for having an 
administrative state in the first place.30 This argument relies for evidence on 
recent litigation that has surfaced the dearth of expertise and the lack of 
responsiveness and flexibility around automation in open court at least at 
the state level.  
 
Part IV begins the complex project of resuscitating the justification for 
technology-enabled agencies. In particular, we call attention to the prospect 
that advances in artificial intelligence—thoughtfully deployed—have the 
potential to improve agency decision-making and planning. Agencies are 
increasingly able to “model” instead of “muddle” through, and could use 
technology to help meet societies rising expectations for impartiality and 
responsiveness.31 
 
I.  REPLACING VALUES COMPROMISED  
 
There is a growing sense of unease as machines intrude upon 
humankind’s most important institutions. Scholarship over the past decade 
have explored the impacts of automating various facets of criminal, civil, 
and administrative justice.32 The consequences include the erosion of due 
 
30 Such an argument has been mentioned in passing, first by the authors and later by 
others, but has yet to be developed into a full-throated account.  
31 See infra, Part IV. The reference is to Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of 
‘Muddling Through,’ 19 Pub. Admin. R. 79 (1959).  
32 See, e.g., VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS 
PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018); Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big 
Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016); Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. 
Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103, 115–18 
(2018); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 1249 
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. L. FORUM 355 
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 
(2014); Sonia Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA 
L. Rev. 54 (2019); Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 633 
(2017); Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126 YALE L.J. 1972, ; Paul Schwartz, Data 
Processing and Government Administration: The Failure of the American Legal Response 
to the Computer, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 1322 (1992); Sonja B. Starr, Evidence-Based 
Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 Stan. L. Rev. 803 
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process guarantees, the reification of race, class, and gender bias, and the 
undermining of structural safeguards. On the standard account, the “black 
box” of algorithmic justice simultaneously propagates error and bias while 
providing the veneer of objectivity.33 Tasks once performed by officials and 
juries is now undertaken by machines. And procedural mechanisms of 
transparency and accountability have not kept pace. 
 
This inquiry has a cyclical quality. Writing in 1991, Paul Schwartz 
chronicled the growing dependence of the administrative state on the 
collection, storage, and processing of data using computers. Organizing his 
critique around two case studies, Schwartz argued that a newfound reliance 
on computers and data threatened the administration of “bureaucratic 
justice.”34 In particular, the “seductively precise” conclusions of machines 
function as objective criteria that lessen the perceived need for subjective 
judgments by people.35 Computers, as deployed by the government, resist 
accountability and rob participants of their dignity, largely by removing 
their capacity to understand the processes to which they have been 
subjected.  
 
Twenty years prior, Lawrence Tribe famously dismissed Bayesian 
approaches to evidence as “trial by mathematics.”36 Tracing a line between 
the practice of numerology in the Middle Ages and the American reverence 
for statistics in the 1970s, Tribe walked through the various problems 
associated with introducing probabilistic evidence into court to establish 
facts. Tribe cast mathematics as the original black box, incapable of deep 
scrutiny by the trier of fact. He noted the varied ways mathematical 
formulas seduce the unfamiliar juror or judge into a perception of 
objectivity. Tribe bemoaned the dehumanizing changes mathematical 
methods bring to the very “character of the trial process itself.”37  
 
Each of these issues is, or should be, relevant today.38 Schwartz’s case 
 
(2014).   
33 E.g., FRANK PASQUALE, BLACK BOX SOCIETY (2015). 
34 Schwartz, supra, note., at. The reference is to JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC 
JUSTICE (1983). 
35 Schwartz, supra, note., at. 
36 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal 
Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971). 
37 Id. 
38 Substitute “algorithm” for “math” and Trial By Algorithm could easily appear as a 
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studies of family aid and child welfare enforcement mirror almost precisely 
the case studies animating Automating Inequality, a celebrated book from 
2017.39 The very issue that sparked the trial by mathematics debate—a 
prosecutor’s efforts in People v. Collins to link an interracial couple to a 
crime using statistics—closely parallels the now infamous ProPublica story 
on racial bias in algorithmic risk assessment for sentencing.40 Whatever its 
antecedents, the puzzle of how changes in technology interact with the 
dispensation of justice is once again timely and critical.  
 
Our specific focus here is the administrative state’s turn toward 
automation. To date, this conversation has tended to foreground procedural 
due process—i.e., the process the state owes individuals before depriving 
them of life, liberty, or property—as well as challenges to rulemaking and 
open-sunshine commitments.  
 
Schwartz, in 1991, focused on the ways that computer and data-driven 
decision-making thwarted process values, such as privacy, justice, and 
autonomy. Years later, one of us (Citron) highlighted the mismatch behind 
the automated state and procedural guarantees, arguing for a new form of 
“technological due process” that would restore accountability and 
transparency to the system.41 This work observed, for instance, that the 
Matthews calculus for due process was ill-suited to automated systems 
because it assumed that interventions would be cheap in the individual 
instance but expensive at scale. In reality, a deep vetting of agency software 
is expensive at the front end but the benefits propagate across the entire 
system at the end. Such vetting is crucial because programming mistakes 
constituted ultra vires assumption of rulemaking power without legally 
required notice and public participation. 
 
Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz, in 2014, explore the prospect of 
“procedural data due process” to mitigate the tendency of data-driven 
analyses to “evade or marginalize traditional privacy protections and 
 
title in volume 134 of the Harvard Law Review. You’re welcome to the title.  
39 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 180-88 (2018). 
40 Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, Bias in Criminal Risk Scores Is Mathematically 
Inevitable, Researchers Say, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 30, 2016, 4:44 PM), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/bias-in-criminal-risk-scores-is-mathematically-
inevitable-researchers-say. 
41 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249 
(2008); Danielle Keats Citron, Open Code Governance, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 355 (2008). 
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frameworks.”42 Crawford and Schultz draw from history, scholarship, and 
precedent to identify the elements of a fair hearing, seeking to translate 
those commitments into a world rife with analytics.43 More recent work by 
Crawford and Schultz focuses on accountability for third-party vendors, 
suggesting that algorithms and artificial intelligence be considered state 
action for purposes of constitutional challenges.44  
 
Joshua Kroll and an interdisciplinary team of co-authors, noted above, 
decry the disconnect between decision-making systems—such as the 
algorithmic processes used by the IRS to select whom to audit or by 
immigration authorities to distribute visas—and the accountability 
mechanism that purport to govern them. They explore techniques by which 
“authorities can demonstrate . . . that automated decisions comply with key 
standards of legal fairness.”45 They offer “procedural regularity,” which 
partly draws upon “the Fourteenth Amendment principle of procedural due 
process,” as the guiding principle for the redesign of agency systems.46 
 
Recent work by Deidre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger thinks 
systematically about “procurement as policy,” whereby agencies hide 
policies changes in harder to review decisions about the purchase of 
machine learning systems.47 According the authors, “these systems 
frequently displace discretion previously held by either policymakers 
charged with ordering that discretion, or individual front-end government 
employees on whose judgment governments previously relied.”48 Mulligan 
and Bamberger offer a variety of techniques by which to reintroduce the 
human expertise, discretion, and political accountability that machines have 
displaced. 
 
42 Kate Crawford & Jason Shultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward a Framework to 
Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014). 
43 Id., at 121–28 (2014). 
44 Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, AI Systems as State Actors, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 
1941 (2019). 
45 Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 675 (2017). 
46 Id, at 633, 675 (2017). The authors also explore technical means by which to assure 
fidelity to the “substantive policy choice” of nondiscrimination. Id. at 678–95. 
47 Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement as Policy: 
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 773 (2019). But 
see Engstrom et al., supra note, at 15 (finding that “[c]ontrary to much of the literature’s 
fixation on the procurement of algorithms through private contracting, over half of 
applications (84 use cases, or 53%) were built in-house…”). 
48 Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note, at. 
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These wise interventions, and many more, proceed from the assumption 
that the substitution of technology for people reduces transparency, 
accountability, or some other value. Constitutions and statutes, after all, 
were written on the assumption that people, not machines, would make 
decisions and execute most consequential tasks. Imagine, for example, a top 
presidential candidate is a self-aware machine built in 2050. Would the 
Constitution, written by and about human beings, require that our robot wait 
to become president until 2085, making it the requisite 35 years of age?49  
 
The substitution approach represents, in a sense, the legacy of the 
thinking of cyberlaw pioneer Lawrence Lessig. The ascendance of the 
commercial internet in the 1990s, which appeared to stand apart from 
existing social structures, led early theorists to predict an end to 
authoritarianism. Lessig famously rejected this premise, predicting instead 
that our collective mediation by technology would shepherd in an era of 
exquisite control by governments and firms as they come to understand the 
new levers of power.50  
 
In making his case, Lessig developed at least two sets of ideas that 
continue to guide law and technology analysis. First, Lessig postulated that 
law is only one of four “modalities” of regulation available to powerful 
institutions to channel behavior—markets, norms, and architecture also 
represent means of exerting control.51  Even if a virtual or geographically 
dispersed community cannot be reached directly by statutes or court orders, 
the community is nevertheless governed by the software, hardware, and 
networks that constitute their underlying architecture. Second, Lessig 
understood the interaction between law and cyberspace as a function of 
“latent ambiguities,” i.e., legal puzzles revealed only when a change in 
technology alters human habits and capabilities.52 Although less remarked 
 
49 See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of 
the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the 
Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have 
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the 
United States.”). The example is adapted from Ryan Calo, Much Ado About Robots, Cato 
UNBOUND (April 11, 2018), https://www.cato-unbound.org/2018/04/11/ryan-calo/much-
ado-about-robots. 
50 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
51 Id. See also Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661 
(1998) (first articulating the four modalities of regulation as law, norms, markets, and 
architecture).  
52 LESSIG, CODE, supra note, at. See also James H. Moor, What is Computer Ethics?, 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590
27-Feb-20] THE AUTOMATED ADMNISTRATIVE STATE 13 
than Lessig’s mantra that “code is law,” the notion that new technologies 
reveal latent ambiguities in the law informed a generation of technology law 
scholars.   
 
Lessig’s approach was and remains groundbreaking; it is also deeply 
intuitive to lawyers, already steeped in analogic reasoning and problem 
solving. We should not be surprised, therefore, to see the approach reflected 
across the legal academy decades later. We certainly should not be surprised 
to see the approach reflected in analyses of algorithms and artificial 
intelligence.  
 
These technologies fascinate precisely for their ability to substitute for 
humans. The law assumes that humans will drive cars. Now robots do. 
Scholars, ourselves included, ask how we might reconstitute law, markets, 
norms, or technology to address the myriad latent ambiguities revealed 
when things start to act like people. There is the new practice that 
challenges existing legal assumptions. There is the resolution by code or 
law that restores us to the status quo. While there are certainly outliers, 
much law and technology scholarship follow this basic pattern. 
 
We aim to challenge this long-standing approach. The problem with the 
substitution frame is two-fold. By focusing on the specific guarantees that 
new technology displaces, the substitution approach inevitably misses the 
opportunity to reexamine first principles. Critics of algorithmic decision-
making have largely assumed the prospect of restoring the status quo 
through specific alternations to legal and technical design, rather than 
foreground broader questions of legitimacy.53  
 
The substitution approach also fails to consider whether the existing 
status quo is sufficient in light of new technical capabilities. Analyses of 
driverless car liability have largely assumed that people would still own 
individual vehicles but that they would not drive them.54 But the 
 
16 Metaphilosophy 266 (1985) (discussing how technology creates “policy vacuums”). 
53 Cf. Anna Lauren Hoffmann, Where fairness fails: data, algorithms, and the limits of 
antidiscrimination discourse, INFO., COMM. & SOC. 22:7, 900-915 (2019) (arguing in the 
context of antidiscrimination that explorations of algorithmic bias “have tended to admit, 
but place beyond the scope of analysis, important structural and social concerns related to 
the realization of data justice”).  
54 E.g., Kenneth S. Abraham & Robert L. Rabin, Automated Vehicles and 
Manufacturer Responsibility for Accidents: A New Legal Regime for a New Era, 105 VA. 
L. REV. 127 (2019) (addressing a gap in tort law occasioned by substituting machines for 
human drivers).  
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technologies that underpin driverless cars could, for example, lead to a 
wholesale reexamination of mobility and transportation.55 Perhaps the 
ascendance of artificial intelligence means that agencies should be held to 
higher standards and asked to pursue greater or different values. 
 
II.  JUSTIFYING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
As the previous part describes, challenges to agency automation tend to 
admonish the government for supplanting procedural rights and values by 
substituting a machine decision-maker for a human official. 
Recommendations take the form of changes to law or design that restore the 
status quo ex ante by reinstating the ability of subjects to understand, shape, 
and challenge the rules and decisions to which they are subject.  
 
What follows is an argument that, in addition to the valuable work of 
restoring lapsed or eroded safeguards, critics should pull at the threads of 
the arguments justifying the automated administrative state to assess 
whether the entire tapestry unravels. That is a crucial missed opportunity, 
one we aim to repair. 
 
A.  Responding to Agency Skepticism: Governance in a Complex World   
 
American administrative agencies have faced skepticism almost from 
their inception.56 The reasons for skepticism are heterogeneous and 
evolving. Charges against agencies have run the gamut from 
overzealousness to bureaucratic inefficiency to agency capture and 
politicization.57  
 
55 See Ryan Calo, Commuting to Mars: A Response to Professors Abraham and Rabin, 
105 VA. L. REV. ONLINE 84 (2019) (critiquing the authors’ assumption that autonomous 
transportation would continue to involve individual vehicle ownership). 
56 See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civil Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 
105 HARV. L. REV. 1511 (1992). Note that in the discussion that follows, we are describing 
federal agencies and administrative law. State agencies are subject to analogous if slightly 
different constraints. See Arthur Ear Bonfield, The Federal APA and State Administrative 
Law, 72 VA. L. REV. 297, 297 (1986) (“When the states developed their administrative law, 
they adopted many of the general concepts embodied in the 1946 Administrative Procedure 
Act.”). Meanwhile, the examples that animate this paper are, by and large, state agency 
examples where existing litigation has focused and generated a record. Our argument 
therefore makes at least one of two speculative assumptions: (1) that the case for the 
legitimacy of state agencies mirrors that of federal agencies or (2) that the trend in 
automation at the federal level exemplifies similar dynamics as the states. 
57 E.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS 
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But the deepest critique of the administrative state came early and never 
left—namely, that administrative agencies by their very nature violate the 
text and spirit of the Constitution in exercising and even comingling powers 
committed to separate branches.58  
 
There are distinct yet related aspects to this challenge. The first is that, 
because the Constitution vests “all legislative powers” in a Congress, the 
legislature is not free to delegate its authority to a separate body—a 
principle known as non-delegation.59 The second concern is that, by vesting 
agencies with the authority to make, enforce, and interpret rules, Congress 
violates the doctrine of separation of powers implicit in the tripartite 
structure of government. Like the mythological Fates who spin, measure, 
and cut, each branch of government has a separate power than the other—
the power to create, enforce, and interpret law.60 Agencies by their nature 
elide these powers together.  
 
Bolstering these concerns is the contested observation that agencies 
permit Congress to insulate itself from political fallout.61 Rather than 
confront hard policy choices squarely as part of an open political process, 
the existence of agencies permits Congress to forward difficult decisions to 
the bureaucrats, many of whom are career officials who are largely 
insulated from the wrath of constituents. If the agency’s actions garner 
public approval, then Congress and the President can claim credit. If the 
actions or inactions of the agency garner scorn, Congress can distance itself 
from the decision and even haul in the offending official for excoriation for 
good measure. Open agency processes also become a lightning rod for 
special interests, who are then less likely to trouble Congress with their 
complains and demands.  
 
Since 1935, when the Supreme Court struck down two broad 
 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014).   
58 ADRIAN VERMEULE, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of 
Constitutional and Ordinary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
at *3 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015), 
59 Id. 
60 Id. The Fates or “Moirai” are physical manifestations of the concept of destiny that 
appear in HESIOD, THEOGONY and elsewhere as part of Greco-Roman lore.  
61 SCHOENBROD, supra, note. For a well-known counterpoint, see Jerry Mashaw, 
Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J. LAW, ECON. & 
ORG. 81 (1984).  
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delegations of power to the Franklin Delano Roosevelt Administration 
under the National Industrial Recover Act of 1933, few nondelegation 
challenges have gotten much traction.62 All the Constitution seems to 
require of Congress today is that it lay down an “intelligible principle” in 
the agency’s organic statute that guides agency action.63 Such a principle 
can be broad indeed: the Federal Trade Commission Act charges the FTC 
with policing against “unfair and deceptive practice.”64 Congress need only 
provide the agency with an adequate sense of its will and expectations and 
agency officials are off and running. For present purposes, the precise 
contours of the intelligible principle test are less interesting than the 
rationale for upholding what is today a massive administrative state 
touching most aspects of daily life.  
 
Proponents of agencies then and now have countered skeptics with great 
force.65 Some note that while the Constitution does not endorse the 
establishment of (many) agencies, nor does it expressly forbid them. Nearly 
all proponents draw from a similar set of positive justifications for the 
administrative state that came ultimately to be reflected in Supreme Court 
precedent. Foremost among these justifications is that managing the modern 
world is beyond the institutional capability of Congress alone. Agencies are 
anomalous but necessary because the world is more complex and dynamic 
than the Framers might have imagined.66 
 
Several related insights follow. It follows that Congress must obtain 
assistance from another entity to carry out its statutorily committed 
responsibilities. Protecting the Jews of Progue was beyond the capacity of 
 
62 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.LA. Schechter Poultry 
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Supreme Court caselaw also prohibits 
Congress from using administrative constructs to reserve for itself a power the Constitution 
does not commit to it (e.g., appointment), limiting the constitutionally assigned power of 
another branch (e.g., removal), or bypassing a constitutional mandate (e.g., bicameralism 
and presentment). INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).  
63 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, __ (1989), quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & 
Co. v. Untied States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928). Changes in the composition of the Supreme 
Court, especially the appointment of noted delegation skeptic Justice Brent Kavanaugh, 
may eventually lead the Court to reexamine this doctrine.  
64 Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. §41(5). 
65 [string cite] 
66 See GILLIAN E. METZGER, Delegation, Accommodation, and the Permeability of 
Constitutional and Ordinary Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
at *9-10 (Mark Tushnet, Mark A. Graber, & Sanford Levinson eds., 2015).For example, 
the first Congress decided it needed to choose where post offices would be built.  
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the Rabbi ben Bezalel; legend has it that he had to fashion a golem.67 Then 
too, the entity must be positioned to accrue adequate expertise to manage a 
complex industry, challenge, or societal environment. And the entity must 
have sufficient flexibility—indeed, the discretion—to individuate its 
policies by context and respond to changes on the ground in our dynamic 
contemporary world.  
 
The Supreme Court has endorsed each of these precepts on multiple 
occasions. Famously in Mistretta v. United States, the Court announced:  
 
our jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding 
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing 
and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job 
absent an ability to delegate power under broad general 
directives.68 
 
The functionalist position has clear intuitive appeal. Congress is 
comprised of a few hundred representatives and their staff. For the 
legislature not only to become expert in railway travel, disease control, or 
nuclear energy, but to keep up with changes in these fields and deal with 
exceptions or special circumstances, seems fair beyond any single body’s 
institutional capacity. Rather, Congress must be permitted to create a series 
of entities, each capable of mastering a particular domain and of making 
informed choices within that context. Indeed, the position must have clear 
intuitive appeal, given that the Constitution just as clearly vests “All 
legislative Powers herein granted” in Congress.69  
 
The allowances enabling the administrative state occur against the 
important backdrop of structural safeguards. In 1946, in reaction to the 
explosion of agency activity under FDR during the New Deal, reformers in 
Congress forced through the Administrative Procedure Act as a 
compromise.70 This statute lays out the structure under which federal 
agencies must operate and instructions to the courts on how to review 
them.71 Many agency activities fly under the radar of administrative law as 
 
67 RICHARD D.E. BURTON, PRAGUE: A CULTURAL HISTORY 62-69 (2003). 
68 488 U.S. 361, __. 
69 See U.S. CONST. art. 1. 
70 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
Inc., et al., 425 U.S. 519, 523-24 (1978) (describing the origins of the APA).  
71 The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. The APA has 
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non-binding. These include reports, convenings, and myriad other actions 
that have no direct impact on the primary conduct (behavior) of regulated 
entities or the public. But when agencies act upon the world or bind their 
own conduct in particular ways, they are subject to procedural constraints 
and open to judicial review. 
 
The APA provides for two major means of binding agency action: 
rulemaking, whereby the agency formulates prospective regulations, and 
adjudications, whereby the agency applies those rules to particular regulated 
entities.72 Most rulemaking and adjudication are in conception “informal” 
and hence it is up to agency, largely in its discretion, to set out the 
procedures.73 But even so, Congress and the courts generally require 
agencies making rules to solicit stakeholder comments on those rules and 
provide detailed explanations of their bases.74 Similarly, agency 
adjudications must satisfy the strictures of due process and generate a 
sufficient record to as to be subject to meaningful judicial review.75  
 
Judicial review of administrative actions is highly complex. The inquiry 
involves a blend of common law, constitutional law, and statutory 
interpretation. Broadly speaking, courts defer to agency interpretations of 
their own organic statutes unless congressional will is clear, the agency’s 
interpretation is unreasonable, or deference is otherwise inappropriate.76 
Courts give arguably greater deference to an agency’s interpretation of its 
own duly-promulgated regulations, which generally will control unless 
clearly erroneous.77  
 
Under the APA, the DNA of the federal administrative state, courts 
 
remained nearly unchanged over six decades, although it was amended to include a 
transparency provision known as the Freedom of Information Act. Id., § 552 (2009). 
72 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553, 554. 
73 Id., at § 553. 
74 Id. (requiring notice, comment, and statement). See also Danielle Keats Citron, 
Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, ___ (2008) (discussing how 
software undermines informal rulemaking). 
75 Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).  
76 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–45 
(1984). 
77 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 117 (1997). Recently the Supreme Court placed limits on 
Auer, precluding greater deference absent genuine ambiguity, and then only where the 
agency has relevant expertise and has exercised appropriate judgement. Kisor v. Wilke, 
139 S.Ct. 2400 (2019). 
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defer to agency fact-finding as well as reasoning in arriving at a decision 
unless it is unsupported by substantial evidence or otherwise arbitrary or 
capricious.78 Where an agency has expertise but no clear enforcement 
authority, courts are nevertheless obliged to give extra weight to the 
interpretation according to its persuasiveness.79 Courts even defer to 
agencies on whether additional process, due under the Fifth Amendment, is 
helpful or burdensome—despite a general commitment to review 
constitutional questions de novo: “In assessing what process is due in this 
case, substantial weight must be given to the good faith judgments of the 
individuals charged by Congress with the administration of social welfare 
programs that the procedures they have provided assure fair consideration 
of the entitlement claims of individuals.”80  
 
Riddled with caveats and nuances (and a headache for students), these 
standards of deference constitute Administrative Law 101. The primary 
justification for such deference is very similar to the justification of the 
administrative state as a whole: agency expertise. Courts presume that the 
agencies are experts in designated policy areas whereas courts are not. That 
argument is fortified by the notion that courts owe deference to agencies 
because they are entrusted given their expertise to fulfill congressional 
mandates. The very reason that Congress can transfer its authority under the 
Constitution to another, technical body is, again, the agencies’ particular 
ability to accrue expertise and respond with flexibility and precision to 
specific problems. 
 
B.  Deference to Algorithms? 
 
Much scholarship questions the legality of agency actions using 
algorithms. Very little work to date interrogates the ongoing sufficiency of 
the justifications underpinning the automated administrative state. Work by 
one of us (Citron) has addressed the impact of automation on notice and 
choice requirements in agency rulemaking and public participation 
generally.  Technological Due Process began the work of conceptualizing 
automated systems as “de facto delegations of rulemaking power,” arguing 
that agencies in essence re-delegate their Congressional authority to 
computer programmers.81 And the paper noted—with great concern—the 
 
78 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
79 Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
80 Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1975). 
81 Citron, supra, note, at.  
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irony that the inevitable changes to policy that come from effectively re-
writing written laws via automation should be entitled to zero deference 
from courts but in practice will be largely unreviewable.82 
 
A recent paper instead defends the use of certain tools by agencies in 
select contexts as consistent with the APA. Cary Coglianese and David 
Lehr “consider how nonhuman decision tools would have to be used to 
comport with the nondelegation doctrine and with rules about due process, 
antidiscrimination, and governmental transparency.”83  The authors dismiss 
the concern over delegation on the apparent basis that the necessity of 
setting an “objection function,” or goal, for machine learning systems 
means that there will always be an “intelligible principle” in the 
constitutional sense, and that algorithms lack self-interest, such that 
delegating to machines differs from delegating to private parties.84 
 
We question whether an objective function, in the sense of an arbitrary 
goal the system seeks to maximize, bears the slightest resemblance to an 
intelligence principle directed at agency officials. Yet Coglianese and 
Lehr’s analysis is most interesting for what it omits. The authors analyze 
machine learning under a doctrine developed to ascertain whether 
delegations to people pass constitutional muster. They do not appear to 
question whether re-delegating authority to machines in ways that jettison 
expertise and discretion might undermine the vary rationale for delegation. 
Said another way, Coglianese and Lehr appear to conflate the test itself for 
the reasons behind it.  
 
Mulligan and Bamberger come to a different conclusion than 
Coglienese and Lehr. Their recent paper focuses on the ways government 
adoption of new technology—particularly the artificial intelligence 
technique of machine learning—undermines key democratic elements of 
administrative governance.85 Citing one of us (Citron), they note that 
policymaking requires notice and comment, which procurement of software 
systems appears to end-run.86 The authors emphasize in particular the 
 
82 Id. 
83 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision 
Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2017). 
84 Id. 
85 See Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Procurement As Policy: 
Administrative Process for Machine Learning, 34 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 781 (2019). 
86 Id. 
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“foundational principle that decisions of substance must not be arbitrary or 
capricious”—a standard located in the APA.87 The systems the U.S. 
government is increasingly procuring yield results no human can justify.  
 
These few works appear to constitute the entirety of the conversation to 
date regarding the legitimacy of the automated state as a matter of first 
principles.88 Normatively, each work grounds its force in meeting or failing 
to meet a doctrinal or statutory requirement.  
 
We believe more needs to be said regarding the fundamental legitimacy 
concerns raised by automation. We do not expect or hope to be the final 
word on this issue. Our purpose is to marshal argument and evidence 
sufficient to touch off a discussion of whether the automated administrative 
state is headed for a legitimacy crisis. We see reason to think that it is. 
 
III. THE LOOMING LEGITIMACY CRISIS 
 
The administrative state has been justified for over a century in a 
particular way. The argument that automation is eroding agency legitimacy 
is conceptual and empirical. The conceptual component is straight forward. 
If the administrative state represents a constitutional anomaly justified by 
scholars and courts in light of the affordances of bureaucracies—namely, 
the accrual of expertise, the potential for individuation and rapid response, 
and the exercise of discretion—then the absence of these qualities 
undermines that justification. This is especially so where the structural 
safeguards that discipline administrative power are being eroded by the 
same machine processes. We will make this argument at length below.  
 
The empirical question is different. The empirical question asks whether 
and to what extent agencies are, in fact, throwing away expertise and 
discretion. Historically this has not been and easy question to answer. And 
it remains difficult, given the protections of trade secret,89 the nuances of 
“policy by procurement,”90 and the vagaries of administrative law.91 Yet, in 
 
87 Id. 
88 In a forthcoming book chapter, Supreme Court of California Justice Mariano-
Florentino Cuéllar discusses the trade-offs involved in delegating agency decisions to 
machines. He problematizes delegation but does not go so far as to question the theoretical 
footing or justification of the administrative state.  
89 See Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1377–95 (2018). 
90 Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note. 
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recent years, important gaps have been filled. Litigation across the country 
in a diverse array of administrative contexts has revealed a common pattern: 
agencies do not understand and cannot control the machines to which they 
have delegated their authority. 
 
A.  Lessons from Litigation 
 
Due to the courage and diligence of lawyers all over the country, we are 
in a better position today than in recent memory to understand the 
pathologies of agency automation and its betrayal of the presumption of 
agency expertise and flexibility. In the decade since the publication of 
Technological Due Process, governments have doubled down on 
automation despite its widening problems. The state’s embrace of 
automation, however, has not gone unchallenged, for the good of impacted 
individuals and scholarly evaluation of the corrosion of expertise, 
flexibility, and nimbleness in agency action. 
 
Automation has not been a clear win for governmental efficiency and 
fairness as administrators hoped and as vendors claimed. It has not 
eliminated bias but rather traded the possibility of human bias for the 
guarantee of systemic bias. Prior failures have not informed present efforts. 
Instead, problems have multiplied, diversified, and ossified. Government 
has expanded automation despite clear warnings about potential pitfalls. 
Agencies have continued to use relatively straightforward rules-based 
systems despite their obvious flaws. More troublingly, they have adopted 
even more complex and even more varied efforts at automated decision-
making despite proof of concept.92  
 
Automation has misallocated public resources, denied individualized 
process, and exacted significant costs on individuals. Automated systems 
are hardly engines of efficiency. To the extent that they are predictable, it is 
in their misdirection of government services. They impair individualized 
process, making decisions about individuals without notice and a chance to 
 
91 Sovereign immunity entitles the government to set the terms of when and if agencies 
are sued. The APA waives immunity for some non-monetary (i.e., equitable) relief but 
subject to extensive requirements including finality, ripeness, and exhaustion of 
administrative remedies. See Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137 (1993). 
92 Harry Surden, Values Embedded in Legal Artificial Intelligence (U. of Colo. Law 
Legal Studies Research Paper, No. 17-17, 2017), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2932333. 
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be heard93 and embedding rules that lack democratic imprimatur.94 They 
create instability and uncertainty that upends people’s lives. And they mask 
difficult policy choices. If agencies want to make policy choices like cutting 
care for certain types of beneficiaries, they ought to say so rather than 
burying the problem in an automated system. 
 
In courts across the country, attorneys have challenged government 
automation’s pathologies in varied arenas, including public benefits, jobs, 
child-welfare, airline travel, and criminal sentencing. Litigation has forced 
some government agencies to address glaring problems, but others persist. 
Because challenges to systems have wrought ad hoc rather than systemic 
change, we have only begun to discover the pathologies of the automated 
administrative state. Then too, litigation offers a limited set of tools—it can 
only address violations of laws or constitutional commitments already 
enshrined in law.  
 
The litigation highlighted shows how far away we have moved from the 
animating reasons for agency delegation. It demonstrates that automation 
has led to the adoption of inexpert tools that waste government resources 
and deny individuals any meaningful form of due process. As the lawsuits 
discussed show, automated systems create chaos rather than providing more 
nimble and flexible responses. 
 
We have already mentioned the ill-fated system adopted by the 
Arkansas Department of Human Services. In Arkansas as in other states, 
physically-disabled Medicaid recipients can opt to live at home with state-
funded care in lieu of residing in a nursing facility.95 Prior to 2016, 
 
93 See, e.g., Barry v. Lyon, 834 F.3d 706, 710 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that Michigan’s 
public benefits system erroneously terminated food assistance benefits of more than 20,000 
individuals based on crude data matching algorithm in violation of due process guarantees); 
Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019) (lawsuit against companies 
involved in creation of flawed software that erroneously terminated unemployment benefits 
of thousands of Michigan residents); Ryan Felton, Lawsuit challenging Michigan 
unemployment fraud cases moves forward, DETROIT METRO TIMES (Mar. 30, 2016, 6:16 
PM), https://www.metrotimes.com/news-hits/archives/2016/03/30/lawsuit-challenging-
michigan-unemployment-fraud-cases-moves-forward. 
94 See, e.g., Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. 
Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). 
95 AR Choices Provider Manual, 016-06 Ark. Code R. 075, Section 211.000, 213.210; 
see Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary Restraining 
Order, Ledgerwood et al. v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., Case No 60CV-17-442 (Cir. Ct. 
Pulaski Cty.). Home care in Arkansas is on average $18,000 whereas a nursing home 
would cost the state $59,000. “Formula of Care” series, WKARK.com (aired Nov. 17, 
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registered nurses determined the home-care services available to Medicaid 
recipients.96 Nurses interviewed recipients and filled out a 286-question 
survey to determine a person’s hours of weekly home care, with a 
maximum of fifty-six hours per week.97  
 
In 2016, Arkansas DHS replaced nurse evaluations with algorithmic 
decisions. According to DHS administrators, computers would be cheaper 
and would not play favorites as nurses might.98 DHS turned to the nonprofit 
coalition InterRAI, which licenses its “Resource Utilization Group system” 
(RUGs) to agencies across the country.99 In the DHS system, the RUGs 
algorithm sorted physically-disabled Medicaid recipients into categories (or 
tiers) through a complex series of classifications and statistical 




96 Elder Choices Provider Manual § 212.300(D)(6); AAPD Provider Manual § 
212.200(E)(6). 
97 See Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order, Ledgerwood et al. v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., Case No 60CV-17-
442, at 15 (Cir. Ct. Pulaski Cty.). 
98 Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, THE 
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-
cerebral-palsy. DHS Administrator Craig Cloud told local news station that the RUGs 
algorithm “uses objective standards” and renders “consistent decisions.” See Formula for 
Care series, supra note, at. 
99 Id. InterRAI’s algorithms “are used in health settings in nearly half of the US states, 
as well as in other countries.” Id. InterRAI has a contract with DHS. The nonprofit’s 
President Brant Fries serves as the principal investigator on that contract. Excerpted Trial 
Transcript at 3,  Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016). Fries 
built an initial version of RUGs pursuant to a seven million dollar grant from the U.S. 
Government. Id. at 8. The DHS system uses the RUG III home version, which was written 
in January 2009. Id. at 10-11.  
100 Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct. 
Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). To say that the RUGs algorithm is complex 
understates the point. The testimony of Fries demonstrates the point. Excerpted Trial 
Transcript at 11–19, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (“we 
use some fairly sophisticated statistical capability to say . . . . [W]hat explains that this 
person costs more than that person. . . . the statistical software looks through thousands of 
possibilities and says this is the best one.”). Fries noted, “You have to understand, there’s a 
lot of code here. It’s a complicated algorithm. . . . there’s 17 pages of code. Someone took 
this code, which is written in a very basic language that any programmer can understand, 
but someone has to take this logic and translate it into whatever the software is that the 
vendor uses.” Id. at 51. 
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decisions. The vendor used the RUGs algorithm to calculate the number of 
hours of care allocated to individuals on a weekly basis.101 Medicaid 
recipients, once sorted into a tier, could not be moved to another tier even if 
their needs changed.102 
 
Once in practice, the new system produced arbitrary and illogical 
results.103 If a person was a foot amputee, the RUGs algorithm indicated 
that the person had “no foot problems” even though the lack of the limb 
meant that they needed more assistance rather than less.104 It ignored crucial 
facts about individuals, such as their ability to walk, frequency of falls, and 
history of continence.105 It failed to account for the severity of individuals’ 
conditions even though DHS regulations required an account of such 
distinctions.106 For instance, the “algorithm allocates someone with 
quadriplegia, dementia, and schizophrenia the same care as someone who 
just has quadriplegia, even though the dementia and schizophrenia likely 
mean that more care time is needed.”107 Kevin De Liban, counsel for Legal 
Aid of Arkansas, astutely coined the phrase “algorithmic absurdities” to 
capture these developments.108  
 
In 2016, De Liban sued DHS in federal court on behalf of physically-
disabled Arkansas residents whose home care had been reduced an average 
of 43 percent after the adoption of RUGs.109 For one Medicaid recipient, aid 
 
101 Excerpted Trial Transcript at 49, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. 
Oct. 27, 2016) (Testimony of Brant Fries). 
102 Id.  
103 Lecher, supra note, at. 
104 Id. 
105 Kevin De Liban, “Algorithm Absurdities—RUGs as Implemented in Arkansas,” 
Legal Aid of Arkansas, 
https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1t2ACNXr7D8JBSLja7F3UC3zkl_qu-xg7. authors).  
106 Id. at 2. 
107 Id. 
108 Lecher, supra note, at. Kevin De Liban did what no DHS official could do. When 
DHS officials were stating publicly that they could not explain why the algorithm operated 
as it did, De Liban decoded its decisions by comparing the code and master assessment 
handbook with the cases of more than 150 people who sought his help. Telephone 
Interview with Kevin De Liban (dated April 26, 2019) (notes on file with authors). 
Through that process, De Liban found countless problems, including the ones described 
above. Id. There could have been far more, but De Liban worked with the clients that he 
had to discover the problems that he did. Id. 
109 As De Liban told us, he relied on the arguments in Technological Due Process in 
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was cut more than 56 percent. The algorithmic system left severely disabled 
Medicaid recipients alone without access to food, toilet, and medicine for 
hours on end.110 Approximately 47 percent of Arkansas Medicaid recipients 
were negatively impacted.111  
 
The author of the RUGs algorithm, Brant Fries, testified at trial. During 
cross-examination, DeLiban asked Fries to conduct a manual check of 
plaintiff Ethel Jacobs’s case. As the author of the algorithm, Fries was 
uniquely situated to compare how the code should work and how it actually 
worked.112 What Fries found—and what the state’s counsel sheepishly 
admitted—was that the RUGs system had made “a mistake” in Jacobs’s 
case.113 Plaintiffs’ counsel summed up plaintiffs’ position: “we’re gratified 
that DHS has reported the error and certainly happy it’s been found, but that 
almost proves the point of the case. There’s this immensely complex system 
around which no standards have been published, so no one in their agency 
caught it until we initiated federal litigation and spent hundreds of hours 
and thousands of dollars to get here today.”114 Fries admitted that there were 
likely other mistakes as yet undetected in the system, but offered no 
systemic method capable of detecting and addressing them. 
 
De Liban prevailed in court. A federal judge permanently enjoined DHS 
from automating home care decisions until it could explain the reasons 
behind the decisions.115 After DHS failed to suspend its use of the 
algorithmic system in 2017, De Liban sued the agency in state court, 
seeking to enjoin its operation on the grounds that its adoption violated the 
state’s Administrative Procedure Act. A state judge ordered DHS to stop 
using the RUGs algorithm because the agency failed to follow the state’s 
 
drafting his complaint. Interview of De Liban, supra note. 
110 Memorandum Order, Bradley Ledgerwood v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV-
17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018). 
111 De Liban Interview, supra note, at (discussing federal lawsuit concerning the Home 
Community Based Program). 
112 Excerpted Trial Transcript at 21–22, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16CV00119 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (counsel for Plaintiffs Kevin De Liban) (“DHS is using a system to sort 
those folks into 23 categories. That is what Dr. Fries can tell us about, is what it takes. And 
our claim around due process is—implicates what knowledge is available about how 
people get sorted.”). 
113 Id. at 36. 
114 Excerpted Trial Transcript at 20, 31, Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. 
Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) (testimony of Brant Fries). 
115 Jacobs v. Gillespie, No. 16-CV-00119 (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 2016) (oral ruling). 
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rulemaking procedures. During the rulemaking process, DHS failed to 
explain that human decision-makers would be replaced with an automated 
system.116 
 
The Arkansas litigation sheds light on the pathologies of today’s 
algorithmic decision-making systems. Agencies continue to struggle with 
how to give meaningful notice about a computer’s decisions. Despite a 
decade of experience, for example, we have not yet figured out how to 
provide notice about automated decisions.117  
 
To be clear, Arkansas is not the only state bedeviled by such 
“algorithmic absurdities.” Idaho’s health and welfare agency built its own 
budget software tool to allocate the number of hours of home care for 
disabled Medicaid recipients.118 That algorithmic tool drastically cut 
individuals’ home care hours without explanation. The ACLU asked the 
agency to account for their clients’ change in benefits. An answer never 
arrived. The reason? The algorithm was a “trade secret.”119  
 
The ACLU sued the health agency for injunctive and declaratory relief. 
The lawsuit alleged that the agency violated plaintiffs’ due process rights 
and that its new decision-making tool produced arbitrary results. According 
to plaintiffs’ experts, the system was built on incomplete data and 
“fundamental statistical flaws.”120 During discovery, the ACLU deposed 
 
116 Memorandum Order, Bradley Ledgerwood v. Arkansas Dep’t Hum. Servs., 60 CV-
17-442 (Ark. Cir. Ct. May 14, 2018); see Arkansas Dep’t of Hum. Servs. v. Ledgerwood et 
al., 530 SW.3d 336 (Ark. Sup. Ct. Nov. 9, 2017) (Kemp, Chief Justice). DHS sought to do 
an end run around that ruling, issuing an “emergency” rule saying that it was absolved of 
having to go through a rulemaking process. The trial court found the effort “manifestly 
preposterous” and “disobedient” and granted the plaintiffs’ motion for contempt. Oral order 
(dated) (“Effective immediately, the proposed promulgating emergency rule is hereby 
enjoined, not based on any new action. It is enjoined as a deliberate and calculated 
disobedience of the permanent injunction entered by this court on May 14, 2018.”).  
117 Lecher, supra note, at (quoting Fries as acknowledging that we don’t have best 
practices on how to give notice on how algorithms work and it is “something we should 
do”). 
118 K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp.3d 703, 708 (D. Idaho 2016). 
119 Jay Stanley, Pitfalls of Artificial Intelligence Decisionmaking Highlighted in Idaho 
ACLU Case, ACLU (Jun. 2, 2017, 1:30 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/privacy-
technology/pitfalls-artificial-intelligence-decisionmaking-highlighted-idaho-aclu-case; see 
generally Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and Trade Secrets: Intellectual Property in the 
Criminal Justice System, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1343 (2018).  
120 Id. 
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agency employees about their construction of the algorithmic system.121 As 
plaintiffs’ counsel recounts, “everyone pointed a finger at somebody else.” 
During the depositions, employees claimed that others were responsible. 
“[E]ventually[,] everyone was pointing around in a circle.”122 
 
The court sided with Plaintiffs. The court found that the budget tool’s 
unreliability “arbitrarily deprive[d] participants of their property rights and 
hence violate[d] due process.”123 As the court explained, the agency built 
the tool based on flawed and incomplete information.124 More than 18% of 
the  records used to build the tool “contained incomplete or unbelievable 
information.”125 The court noted that the agency adopted the budget 
software though it knew up to 15% of recipients would not receive adequate 
funding.126 The agency knew the software needed to be recalculated and 
failed to do so, and it never checked to determine how many participants 
were allocated insufficient funds.127  
 
The court urged the parties to “agree upon a plan to improve the [budget 
software] tool and institute regular testing to ensure its accuracy.”128 The 
agency needed to test the tool to ensure its accuracy and establish a “robust 
appeals process where the inevitable errors can be corrected.”129 The court 
further found that notice provided recipients violated due process because it 
gave recipients no explanation for the cut in benefits so that they could not 
challenge the reduction.130 
 
Opaque algorithms decide whether public employees can keep their jobs 
and provide little way for employees to understand why or to protest. Cities 




123 K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F.Supp.3d 703, 718 (D. Idaho 2016). 
124 Id. at 711. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 712. 
128 Id. at 718. 
129 Id. at 714. 
130 Id. at 720. 
131 AI Now, Litigating Algorithms; Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic 
Transparency for the Smart City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103 (2018).  
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Typically, those systems known as “value-added appraisal” systems are 
built by private vendors. The algorithms compare test scores of students at 
the beginning and end of a school year as a way to measure the students’ 
progress and supposedly are “adjusted to try to account for factors other 
than teacher effectiveness, such as socioeconomic status, that might be 
responsible for the students’ progress or lack thereof. The adjusted results 
for the students that are taught by a particular teacher are then used to 
produce an evaluation of that teacher’s effectiveness.”132  
 
Starting in 2011, as Houston school district used a “value-added” 
appraisal system provided by a private vendor SAS to assess teacher 
performance.133 The system measured teacher efficacy by endeavoring to 
track the teacher’s impact on student test scores over time.134 Generally 
speaking, a teacher’s algorithmic score was based on comparing the average 
growth of student test scores of the particular teacher compared to the 
statewide average.135 The score was converted to a test statistic called the 
“Teacher Gain Index,” which classified teachers into five levels of 
performance, ranging from “well above” to “well below” average.136  
 
Initially used to determine teacher bonuses, the algorithmic system was 
used to sanction employees for low student performance on standardized 
tests. In 2012, the school district declared a goal of ensuring that “no more 
than 15% of teachers with ratings of ineffective are retained.”137 It followed 
suit—by 2014, approximately 25% of “ineffective teachers were 
‘exited.’”138  
 
The teachers’ union sued the school district on due process grounds, 
arguing that the teachers could not examine the algorithm in order to 
challenge its accuracy. Plaintiffs sought to permanently enjoin the school 
district’s use of the scores in the termination or nonrenewal of contracts, a 
 
132 Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the Smart 
City, 20 YALE. J. L. TECH. 103 (2018) 





137 Id. at 1174. 
138 Id. at 1175. 
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constitutionally protected property interest.139 The court found a due 
process violation because teachers had no way to replicate and challenge 
their scores.  
 
The court noted its concern about the algorithm’s accuracy. As the court 
point out, the school district never verified or audited the system. The court 
noted that “when a public agency adopts of policy of making high stakes 
employment decisions based on secret algorithms incompatible with 
minimum due process, the proper remedy is to overturn the policy, while 
leaving the trade secrets intact.”140  
 
As the court underscored and as the defendant conceded, scores might 
contain errors, including data entry mistakes and code glitches, which will 
not be promptly corrected.141 The court explained that “Algorithms are 
human creations, and subject to error like any human endeavor.” The court 
expressed concern that the entire system was fraught with inaccuracies 
given the “house-of-cards fragility of the EVAAS system”—the “wrong 
score of a single teacher could alter the scores of every other teacher in the 
district.”142 Thus, “the accuracy of one score hinges upon the accuracy of 
all.”143  
 
In a challenge brought by a public-school teacher in New York, a state 
trial court found that the value-added appraisal model was arbitrary and 
capricious.144 The court highlighted the biases and statistical shortcomings 
of the system and noted the lack of transparency such that the plaintiff could 
not understand what she needed to do to achieve a satisfactory score.  
 
Michigan’s unemployment benefits system is another case in point. 
Before 2013, the Michigan Unemployment Agency had 400 staffers who 
oversaw unemployment claims. Staffers relied on a legacy IT system to 
 
139 Id. at 1174. 
140 Id. at 1179. 
141 Id. at 1177. 
142 Id. at 1178. 
143 Id. The court dismissed the substantive due process claim because the “loose 
constitutional standard of rationality allows government to use blunt tools which may 
produce marginal results.” The court explained that the algorithmic scoring system would 
pass muster under the rationality inquiry even if they are accurate only a little over half of 
the time. Id. at 1182. 
144 Matter of Lederman v. King, 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 26416 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 10, 
2016). 
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administer claims and to check for fraud.145 In 2011, the Michigan 
legislature eliminated the requirement that the state’s Unemployment 
Insurance Agency (Agency) obtain a court order before seizing a claimant’s 
wages, tax refunds, and bank funds. The Agency seized on the chance to 
replace its system with a fully automated one.146 According to officials, an 
automated system would enhance efficiency by eliminating the jobs of one-
third of agency’s staff.147 It promised to identify fraudulent employment 
filings efficiently.148 
 
The Agency spent 45 million dollars on the Michigan Integrated Data 
Automated System (MiDAS), working with a vendor to build the system.149 
MiDAS went live in October 2013. In short order, the number of persons 
accused of unemployment fraud “grew five-fold in comparison to the 
average number found using the old system.”150 In two years, more than 
34,000—up to 50,000—people were accused of fraud. Only seven percent 
of those thousands of individuals had actually committed fraud.151  
 
MiDAS charged those accused a 400% penalty of the claimed amount 
of fraud plus penalties and interest.152  Once claims were substantiated 
through a flimsy notice process, MiDAS garnished the wages, tax refunds, 
and bank accounts of the accused. In its first year, MiDAS generated $69 
 
145 Robert N. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm Alchemy 








150 Id.; Memorandum of Professor H. Luke Shaefer and Michigan Unemployment 
Insurance Project Manager Steve Grey to U.S. Department of Labor Administrator Gay 
Gilbert (dated May 19, 2015), 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/document
s/Shaefer-Gray-USDOL-Memo_06-01-2015.pdf. 
151 Shaefer Memorandum, supra note, at. 
152 Jack Lessneberry, State unemployment computer had anything but the golden 
touch, TRAVERSE CITY RECORD EAGLE (Dec. 31, 2017), https://www.record-
eagle.com/opinion/columns/jack-lessenberry-state-unemployment-computer-had-anything-
but-the-golden/article_c03418a5-41a3-5b87-9663-9d4cfc42591c.html. 
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million in fines from alleged fraud, up from $3 million the year before.153 
Michigan lawmakers have promised to seek at least $30 million in 
compensation for those falsely accused.154 
 
If MiDAS identified discrepancies between information provided by 
claimants and information accessible to the system including employer and 
state agency records, then it would find fraud.155 MiDAS also “flagged 
claimants through an ‘income spreading’ formula, which calculated a 
claimant’s income in a fiscal quarter and averaged the claimant’s weekly 
earnings, even if the person did not actually make any money in a given 
week.”156 MiDAS automatically determined a claimant engaged in fraud if 
the employee reported no income for any week during a quarter in which 
the claimant earned income.157  
 
At least 90% of the MiDAS fraud determinations were inaccurate. Part 
of the problem was that MiDAS was mining corrupt or inaccurate data. For 
instance, a consultant report found that MiDAS has trouble converting data 
from the legacy system.158 MiDAS also could not read information scanned 
into the system.159 Also problematic was the inaccuracies raised by the 
“income spreading” formula. The Agency made no effort to check the 
system’s findings.160 
 
The implications were profound. Once MiDAS flagged fraud through a 
web portal that many people did not check, the state garnished people’s 
wages, federal and state income tax refunds, and bank accounts.161 The 
Agency used these collection techniques without giving claimants an 




155 Cahoo v. SAS Analytics Inc., 912 F.3d 887, 892 (2019). 
156 Id. at 893. 
157 Id. 
158 Paul Egan, Data Glitch Was an Apparent Factor in False Fraud Charges, DETROIT 





161 Cahoo et al. v. SAS Analytics, 912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019). 
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suit against agency officials, the Agency “made no attempt to consider the 
facts or circumstances of a particular case, or determine whether the alleged 
fraud was intentional, negligent, or accidental.”162 
 
Litigation surfaced much of the damning evidence. In April 2015, 
plaintiffs brought a class action against the Agency, alleging that the 
MiDAS “robo-adjudications” violated their due process rights.163 Plaintiffs 
sought to enjoin the Agency from future constitutional violations and to 
require it to maintain proper procedures for determining fraud. The 
complaint alleged that MiDAS never informed claimants about the basis for 
the Agency’s finding of fraud. Under the terms of the settlement, the 
Agency agreed to review all fraud determinations made by MiDAS and to 
stop all collection activities including wage garnishments and tax return 
seizures for claimants who received fraud determinations at the hands of 
MiDAS.164 A class of plaintiffs has sued agency officials in their individual 
capacity as well as the vendor who helped built the system.165 That case is 
ongoing. 
 
Five months later, the Agency ceased using MiDAS for fraud 
determinations after being sued by the federal government. The state 
apologized for the false claims for unemployment fraud. In August 2017, 
the Agency completed a review of fraud cases and reversed 70% of them, 
promising to refund $21 million dollars to claimants. 
 
MiDAS, like other malfunctioning government systems, created havoc. 
People had to hire lawyers to fight the false fraud accusations.166 Many 
could not afford counsel and had to fight the allegations alone, to little 
effect.167 They suffered economic instability.168 Some people had to declare 
 
162 Id. at 894. 
163 Complaint, Zynda v. Zimmer, No. 2:15-CV-11449 (filed E.D. Mi. April 21, 2015). 
164 Id. 
165 Cahoo et al. v. SAS Analytics, 912 F.3d 887 (6th Cir. 2019). 
166 Id. 
167 Memorandum of Professor H. Luke Shaefer and Michigan Unemployment 
Insurance Project Manager Steve Grey to U.S. Department of Labor Administrator Gay 
Gilbert (dated May 19, 2015), 
https://waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/files/document
s/Shaefer-Gray-USDOL-Memo_06-01-2015.pdf (discussing case of Barbara Hills who was 
erroneously accused of committing fraud on ten occasions, all for the same underlying 
mistake, and she had to protest each determination separately). 
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bankruptcy.169 Some had their homes foreclosed, and some “were made 
homeless.”170 People’s credit scores suffered after their wages were 
garnished and tax refunds seized.171 The financial harm exacted may exceed 
$100 million.172 Virginia Eubanks rightly argues that government decision 
making systems create a “digital poorhouse.”173 
 
At the federal level, there are glimpses of similar phenomena. 
Algorithmic determinations have led to the erroneous seizure of people’s 
federal income tax refunds and the garnishment of their wages. They have 
led to the wrongful suspension of people’s Social Security benefits.174 But 
an especially dramatic example deals with the ability of Americans to 
travel.  
 
For many years now, the “No Fly” computer matching system has 
targeted innocent people as terrorists without a meaningful chance to 
exonerate themselves.175 The No-Fly List “prevents listed individuals from 
boarding commercial aircraft.”176 Individuals were denied the right to fly; 
others were detained at airports; still others were arrested.177 The “No Fly” 
data-matching program misidentified individuals because it used crude 
algorithms that could not distinguish between similar names.178 Thousands 
of people got caught in the dragnet, including government officials, military 
veterans, and toddlers.179 The U.S. government would not say if one was on 
 
168 Id. 




173 VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING EQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, 
POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 180–88 (2018). 
174 Interview with De Liban, supra note. 
175 Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note, at 1274-75. 
176 Jeffrey Kahn, Terror Watchlists, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF SURVEILLANCE 73 
(David Gray and Stephen Henderson eds. 2018) 
177 See generally JEFFREY KAHN, MRS. SHIPLEY’S GHOST: THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND 
TERRORIST WATCHLISTS (2013). 
178 Citron, Technological Due Process, supra note, at 1275. 
179 Id.; see also BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 
261 (2017). 
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the list and provided no explanation for no-fly decisions.180  
 
In 2008, the Ninth Circuit held that the composition of watchlists 
warranted judicial review. The court noted: “Just how would an appellate 
court review the agency’s decision to put a particular name on the list? 
There was no hearing before an administrative law judge; there was no 
notice-and-comment procedure. For all we know, there is no administrative 
record of any sort for us to review. So if any court is going to review the 
government’s decision to put [plaintiff] on the No-Fly List, it makes sense 
that it be a court will the ability to take evidence.”181 
 
Ever since then, litigation has had a modest impact on the watchlist 
problem. In those cases, discovery was often short circuited by claims of 
executive privilege or state secrets privilege. In a suit brought by the 
ACLU, thirteen U.S. citizen plaintiffs (including several military veterans) 
alleged that the No-Fly List prevented them from air travel.182 The FBI 
offered to take some of the plaintiffs off the list if they became government 
informants.183 The federal court found that the No-Fly list violated the 
plaintiffs’ due process rights, but refused to dictate a suitable process.184  
 
The court ordered the government to “fashion new procedures that 
provide plaintiffs with the requisite due process . . . without jeopardizing 
national security.”185 The court ordered the government to disclose to the 
plaintiffs their status on the watchlist.186 Seven of the thirteen plaintiffs 
were informed that they were not on the watchlist. 
 
And yet, as Jeffrey Kahn explains, “watchlists are now an established 
feature in the country’s national security architecture, as natural to a 
generation of Americans born after 9/11 as submitting to a search at the 
airport.”187 Anyone who remains on the no-fly list will be unable to get 
 
180 Kahn, supra note, at 90. 
181 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec, 538 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008). 
182 Complaint, Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-750 (D. Or. Nov. 17, 2010). 
183 See, e.g., Third Amended Complaint, Latif v. Lynch, No. 3:10-CV-750 (D. Or. Jan. 
11, 2013). 
184 Latif v. Holder, 28 F. Supp.3d 1134, 1153 (D. Or. 2014). 
185 Id. at 1162. 
186 Latif v. Holder, No. 3:10-CV-750, 2015 WL 1883890, at *1 (D. Or. Apr. 24, 2015). 
187 Id. 
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meaningful notice and a chance to be heard.188 The government still refuses 
to explain why someone appears on the list, though people can file a 
“redress form” to get themselves removed from the list. Barry Friedman 
astutely notes, “This sort of Kafkaesque nightmare should scare all of us, 
right down to our anklebones.”189 
 
People frequently experience “punishing personal trauma” in the wake 
of erroneous automate decision.190 In November 2004, Dr. Rahinah 
Ibrahim, an accomplished architect and academic, was mistakenly included 
on the No-Fly List.191 She was arrested, detained, and denied return to the 
U.S. despite twenty years of legal residency. Ten years later, a federal 
district court judge concluded that she should never have been included on 
the No-Fly List. The judge captured her suffering in this way: “This was an 
error with palpable impact, leading to the humiliation, cuffing, and 
incarceration of an innocent and incapacitated air traveler.”192 
 
B.  Undermining Functionalism 
 
This emerging record, taken together, paints a distributing picture of 
unforced errors and gaps in understanding and accountability. Recall again 
the rationale of scholars and justices in support of the administrative state. 
The legislature commits its authority under broad delegations of power to 
agencies because agencies have the requisite expertise and flexibility to 
govern a complex and evolving world.  
 
But agency officials do not appear to understand the systems they have 
commissioned to carry out this task. Crucially, they cannot explain them in 
public or in court because they do not know how they work. Whatever 
expertise that officials hold gets translated—ostensibly--into software 
language that officials have neither learned to speak nor have any bona fides 
to speak. Having encoded agency rules in automated software systems, 
officials cannot exercise discretion any more than members of the 
legislature. To the extent conditions change—either fiscal, normative, 
scientific, or otherwise—the official is not in a position to adapt.  
 
 
188 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 280 (2017). 
189 BARRY FRIEDMAN, UNWARRANTED: POLICING WITHOUT PERMISSION 280 (2017). 
190 Charette, supra note, at. 
191 Ibrahim v. DHS, 62 F. Supp.909, 927 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
192 Id. at 929. 
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In Arkansas, neither agency officials nor third party providers are able 
to articulate how to debug their system, despite the profound consequences 
for disabled residents. In Iowa, benefits were automatically terminated or 
reduced without an adequate evidentiary basis. Agency officials point the 
finger and third-party vendors, who pointed it right back. In Texas, a court 
referred to an algorithmic system by which to assess public teacher 
performance as a “house of cards” that was riddled with uncorrectable 
errors.193 In Michigan, a fraud detection system was inaccurate 90% of the 
time, leading the agency to reverse 70% of determinations.194 The Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the government to fashion new procedures 
around the No-Fly List, which have yet to be developed.195 
 
The administration law literature astutely addresses, in Jody Freedman 
and Martha Minow’s words, “government by contract.”196 The U.S. 
government relies extensively on third party private contractors to carry out 
its responsibilities, particularly in the military and intelligence sectors.197 
Contractors are more difficult to supervise and hold accountable than 
government employees.198 They have been known to waste government 
resources or engage in outright fraud.199 Semi-private parties imbued with 
sovereign authority can undermine democratic norms and diminish the 
capacity of government itself to respond to citizen concerns.200  
 
These concerns are neither overblown nor adequately addressed. Yet 
 
193 Hous. Fed. Teachers v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp.3d 1168, 1172 (S.D. 
Tex. 2017). 
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195 Ibrahim v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 2008). 
196 GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (JODY 
FREEMAN & MARTHA MINOW EDS., 2009). 
197 PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY: HOW PRIVATIZATION OF 
GOVERNMENT FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
(2007); Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: Privatizing Military Efforts and the Risks to 
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they differ substantially from the trends in agency automation. The 
privatization debate concerns which expert is entrusted to carry out the will 
of the public. In some quarters, an excessive reliance on semi-private third 
parties threatens constitutional safeguards and erodes sovereign 
legitimacy.201 Nonetheless, contractors—whether technically public or 
private employees—are capable of acting as repositories of expertise in the 
agency sense. Contractors are often former government employees, which 
gives them bona fides in their bids for government work.202 Relying on 
subject-matter expertise, they can still exercise discretion, give reasons for 
decisions, and respond to evolving needs or circumstances. 
 
The administrative state’s turn toward automation is troubling for the 
absence of such expertise and flexibility. The questions we raise are not 
about which expert is appropriate but rather whether the absence of 
expertise undermines the legitimacy of the automated administrative state. 
Software systems designed, adopted, and deployed today lack the benefits 
of expertise almost entirely.  
 
A number of caveats are in order. We know about the examples above 
because they have resulted in litigation.203 Automated systems that litigants 
challenge presumably represent the outer bounds of egregious agency 
action. At the same time, it is possible that these egregious failures may 
represent the tip of the iceberg. That courts enjoined these systems does 
show that the judiciary is capable of oversight to some degree.  
 
The examples from ligation to date tend to involve state agencies, not 
federal ones. Presumably the justifications for state agencies mirror those 
for federal ones. There are also federal examples, such as the No-Fly List. 
Other countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, have similar 
struggles.204 The APA, meanwhile, imposes significant restrictions as to 
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timing and venue for challenging federal agency action, which state law 
may not, such that challenge federal systems may be more onerous.205 We 
do know, however, that federal agencies are making increasing use of 
algorithms and automation as a matter of fact and official policy.  
 
Importantly, there are, in theory, existing pathways for agency officials 
to reintroduce and reclaim their expertise, discretion, and flexibility. 
Agency officials could become experts in the systems they administer, and 
those systems could be built in such a way so as to preserve discretion and 
respond to changing conditions in real time (e.g., through software updates). 
We are skeptical given two decades of evidence, but it is analytically 
possible and worthy of further exploration. Several recent works we 
mention take this approach. Kroll and his coauthors develop a set of legal 
and technical principles, borrowed from the realm of engineering, that they 
imagine as capable of restoring transparency and accountability to 
administrative and other government decision-making.206 In a lengthy 
section entitled “Informing agency deliberation with technical expertise,” 
Mulligan and Bamberger offer an extensive vision for reintroducing 
technical expertise into procurement and other important government 
processes.207 
 
Nevertheless, the more agencies automate under the current modus 
operandi, the more they undermine the premise of the administrative state. 
Agencies deserve the power they possess based on their expertise, 
flexibility, and nimbleness. This is true at a pragmatic level but also at the 
level of first principles. Agencies that automate throw away expertise and 
discretion with both hands. Automation also thwarts structural requirements 
such as the APA and meaningful judicial oversight.  
 
Meanwhile, agencies waste money rather than make the gains in 
efficiency or anti-biasing that justified the turn to automation in the first 
place. If this trend holds or accelerates, it is high time for scholars and 
society to question not only whether process guarantees are sufficient, but 
whether the entire enterprise is justified in the first instance. Congress 
seems as capable of contracting with software vendors to automate 
 
205 The APA lays out the requirements for challenging agency action at 5 U.S.C. §§ 
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enforcement. A Congress of machines has no need for a middle person. 
 
IV.  TOWARD A NEW VISION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
 
Let us summarize the argument so far. In recent years, we have seen an 
acceleration of a concerning trend towards inexpert, flawed automation. 
Administrative agencies have increasingly turned to automation to make 
consequential, binding decisions about the Americans they govern. The 
trend has not gone unnoticed; as a rich, interdisciplinary literature 
evidences, the automation of the administrative state threatens important 
values such as participation and due process. This Article contributes to this 
discussion by developing a challenge to the automated administrative state 
at the level of justification: an overreliance on algorithms and software 
undermines the very rationale for quasi legislative bureaucracies. Recent 
litigation in particular paints a vivid picture of agency officials who lack 
expertise in the systems that employ, cannot give reasons for binding 
agency actions, and throw away the individualized discretion that justifies 
the administrative state in the first instance. 
 
The present state of affairs invites a variety of reactions. Above we 
alluded to an ongoing project that responds to automation’s disruption of 
rights and values through a combination of legal and technical reforms. 
These include creating “transparent systems and assigning limited 
procedure and substantive rights” (Schwartz),208 developing a full-throated 
conception of “open code governance”209 and “technological due process” 
(Citron),210 reimaging fair hearings211 and treating machines as state actors 
(Crawford and Schultz),212 and developing “technological tools for 
procedural regularity” (Kroll et. al).213  
 
As discussed, these responses largely involve restoring the status quo ex 
ante, shoring up eroded rights and values as opposed to re-examining and 
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justifying the administrative state in toto. Some academics and especially 
activists in recent years have married this call to restore rights and values 
with demands for a moratorium or ban on the use of automation by 
government agencies unless or until its many deficiencies can be 
addressed.214 
 
One response to claims of agency illegitimacy is to try to address the 
shortfalls piecemeal through legal and technical design. A second response 
with a long pedigree is to urge a dramatic reduction in the administrative 
state itself. This is the approach of David Schoenbrod in Power Without 
Responsibility, which conceptualizes the administrative state as a kind of 
political laundering operation whereby Congress seeks to influence the 
world while shielding itself from accountability.215 It is the approach of 
Philip Hamburger in Is Administrative Law Unlawful?, which aims to 
counter the narrative that “binding administrative power is … a novelty, 
which developed in response to the necessities of modern life.”216 For 
Hamburger and others, the administrative state represents a complex play 
for absolute power and hence tyranny. The proper response to political 
laundering or the “revival of absolute power” is to adhere closely to the text 
of the Constitution, dismantle the administrative state, and force Congress 
to do the legislating.217 This is a fortiori true in an automated administrative 
state, wherein agencies commit a significant portion of their power to still 
less accountable third parties that design the systems agencies deploy. 
 
We are sympathetic to, and have deeply engaged with, the first project. 
To the extent the adoption of technology by the state has eroded civil rights 
and values, those rights and values should be restored or else the technology 
should be abandoned. Yet as framed, neither the critique nor the 
recommendations cut deep enough. Even were it possible somehow to 
design legal and technical systems capable of fully restoring due process to 
automated decision-making, a wholesale turn to automation by the agency 
officials could still undermine the justification for the administrative state 
through the displacement of expertise and discretion. But more importantly, 
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the availability of new technological affordances invites an additional, 
important question: is the status quo even sufficient? Put simply, shouldn’t 
the availability of better tools lead to higher standards for governance? 
 
We are less sympathetic to the second project, at least at a practical 
level. Conceptually we understand that a large and expensive bureaucracy 
maintained at public expense, lacking justification even under a 
functionalist interpretation of the Constitution, should not be sustained. But 
the most plausible reason that the administrative state has turned to 
automation in the first place is resource constraints. 218 Due in large measure 
to a political economy that has systematically underfunded and de-
empowered the administrative state, agencies struggle to meet the enormous 
needs and expectations of the populace. “We blame the Department of 
Motor Vehicles for long lines at the counters,” Jerry Mashaw writes, “not 
the legislatures that refuses to fund additional personnel and equipment.”219 
We would not abandon the administrative state, and the many people who 
rely upon it, on the basis that agencies have been channeled by sustained 
political and economic forces into desperate measures that undermine their 
legitimacy.  
 
Ultimately, we prefer a third response, one that neither lets agencies off 
the hook for their often devastatingly poor choices around technology, nor 
forces agencies to abandon technology altogether on pain of political 
extinction. We hope in this final section to lay out a positive vision for how 
the administrative state might engage with new technology more wisely, 
beginning to re-justify itself in light of new affordances and otherwise 
update its mission for the twenty-first century. This positive program 
involves, at base, the deliberate and self-conscious adoption of technology 
to the extent it furthers the rationales for delegating authority and power to 
agencies and not otherwise. 
 
The pathologies of the automated administrative state—discussed in 
detail above—have a common feature. When agencies displace human 
wisdom and expertise in favor of systems that automatically confer or deny 
benefits and rights, disaster seems always around the corner. Harmless 
people are barred from travel. Disabled individuals receive no or fewer 
health services, falling well short of their needs. Teachers and other public 
 
218 For a lengthy discussion, see generally Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending 
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employees lose their jobs or cannot advance in their careers. In the 
analogous criminal context, defendants—particularly racial minorities—
spend longer in prison or jail due to a perceived risk. Meanwhile, 
administrative officials charged by society to oversee these systems do not 
understand how they work, let alone feel empowered to second-guess or 
override them. And addressing the high prevalence of mistakes has so many 
costs that promised gains in efficiency are never realized. 
 
This mismanagement and suffering are all the more perverse as it takes 
place amidst the perception that we live in age of technical wonders. Even 
as we write, techniques of artificial intelligence are transforming the way 
people live, work, and play. Two or more people who speak any of a 
hundred different languages can communicate with one another in real-time 
through language translation systems.220 Algorithms parse billions of 
financial transactions and emails to detect fraud and spam.221 Machine 
learning helps doctors diagnose patients and weather forecasters develop 
faster, more accurate, and more detailed models.222 Enormous, cross-
disciplinary research initiatives—such as the eScience Institute anchored at 
the University of Washington—fuel data-driven discovery across an array 
of fields.223 
 
The modern American administrative state is well over a hundred years 
old. Although we decry the actual deployment of automated software 
systems by agencies to date, we would not deny our government the 
technological affordances of the twenty-first century. As a diverse set of 
scholars have begun to observe, agencies can and sometimes do bring 
advances in information technology constructively to bear on the incredibly 
complex task of regulation and governance. Writing for the journal Nature 
with Kate Crawford in 2016, one of us (Calo) highlighted the potential to 
deploy machine learning by law enforcement to help identify officers at risk 
of excessive force.224 Just such a system was deployed by the Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Police the same year in collaboration with a large, 
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interdisciplinary team from seven major research universities, leading to 
greater predictive accuracy, more targeted interventions, and lower 
instances of misconduct.225  
 
We are not alone in this position. British philosopher Helen Margetts and 
economist Cosmina Dorobantu point to the capacity of technology to help 
governments personalize information and services for constituents, offering 
examples in Queensland, Australia and New Zealand.226 California 
Supreme Court Justice and Stanford Law professor Mariano-Florentino 
Cuéllar imagines a role for machine translation services in discharging the 
obligation of federal and state courts to provide interpreters where, as often, 
a lack of available interprets for defendants or witnesses can mean long 
delays of justice.227 In their aforementioned defense of “regulating by 
robot,” Coglianese and Lehr cite to the use of machine learning to predict 
chemical toxicities and sort the mail.228 These are just a few examples.229 
 
We do not mean to endorse all or any of these specific use cases. Each 
could raise concerns; artificially intelligence systems have their inevitable 
flaws, and all technology is developed and deployed against a backdrop of 
long-standing social, economic, and political inequities.230 In 2017, the 
social media giant Facebook’s bespoke system mistranslated the phrase 
“good morning” in Arabic, posted by a Palestinian worker leaning against a 
bulldozer in a West Bank settlement, to “hurt them” in English and “attack 
them” in Hebrew.231 The post led the man to be arrested and questioned by 
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Israeli police—no doubt a deeply fraught experience in light of the context. 
Similar concerns could arise in virtually any application of artificial 
intelligence by government or industry. 
 
We nevertheless note a difference in the character and orientation of these 
interventions from the automated systems discussed in Part II. Specifically, 
these potential interventions are oriented toward the furthering of 
substantive commitments and values, such as access, quality, and self-
assessment. They are not designed simply to save costs (and in the process 
undermine procedural commitments without garnering more efficiency) but 
rather to enhance the capabilities of the administrative state itself—both 
agencies and officials—to engage in more effective and fair governance. In 
general, they would not outsource agency functions requiring expertise and 
discretion to third parties whose software and hardware deliver neither. 
These efforts have potential to enhance the justification of the bureaucratic 
state by, ideally, generating knowledge, enhancing expertise, tailoring 
outcomes, and increasing responsiveness—the purported reasons Congress 
created agencies to carry out its will in the first place. 
 
One of the areas ripe for change is in understanding the effects of policy 
interventions in complex environments; new technological affordances may 
open the door to less muddling and more modeling. In a classic 1959 article, 
The Science of “Muddling Through,”232 political economist Charles 
Linblom develops the argument that administrators cannot and do not arrive 
at the “best” policy prescription in any given context for several reasons. 
Notably, human beings are incapable of ascertaining and processing all of 
the information they would need to calibrate an optimal policy intervention, 
even assuming unlimited time.  
 
What Linblom calls the “root” method of policymaking, whereby 
policymakers ascertain and maximize values in a single exercise, is 
impossible for real people. In his words: 
 
Although such an approach can be described, it cannot be 
practiced except for relatively simple problems and even then 
only in a somewhat modified form. It assumes intellectual 
capabilities and sources of information that men simply do not 
possess, and it is even more absurd an approach to policy when 
 
232 Charles E. Lindblom, The Science of ‘Muddling Through,’ 19 Pub. Admin. R. 79 
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the time and money that can be allocated to a policy problem is 
limited, as is always the case.233 
 
Although the overwhelming majority of public administration literature 
contemplates the root method, no public administrator deploys it in practice. 
Rather, public administrators follow a “branch” method instead.234 
According to the branch method, which embraces “successive limited 
comparisons” over a “rational-comprehensive” approach, the administrator 
sets a specific goal and attempts to ascertain how to advance it in 
isolation.235 Having deployed a particular intervention, the administrator 
monitors its effects, adjusting with new interventions each time the target or 
another value is compromised in the real world. 
 
Linblom recognized the inevitability of the branch method and 
formalized its application. Rather than exclude important factors 
haphazardly through ignorance, as the root method inevitably does, the 
branch method focuses on a single value at a time and then iterates. 
Throughout his important piece, Lindblom relies again and again on the 
affordances of his contemporaries. The root method is a futile attempt at 
“superhuman comprehensiveness.”236 It calls for an analysis “beyond 
human capacity.”237 Administrators, being people, must muddle through. 
 
The intervening decades have not resulted, as even some of Linblom’s 
contemporaries predicted, in the creation of an artificial superintelligence. 
Yet it cannot be gainsaid that the machines—and therefore, the humans—of 
today are dramatically better at modeling multifaceted behaviors and effects 
than in the late 1950s. This capacity to parse extreme complexity through a 
combination of advances in statistical methods and greater computational 
processing power has been further enhanced in recent years by techniques 
of artificial intelligence.238 The upshot is that contemporary institutions, 
including state and federal agencies, have access to far greater means by 
 
233 Id., at. 
234 Id., at. 
235 Id., at. 
236 Id., at. 
237 Id., at. 
238 Interestingly, many of these techniques were already outlined in theory at the time 
of Lindblom’s paper. It took decades, however, for neural networks and other approaches 
to artificial intelligence to become applicable in practice. Other techniques such as 
reinforcement learning were developed subsequent to 1959.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3553590
27-Feb-20] THE AUTOMATED ADMNISTRATIVE STATE 47 
which to simulate a given regulatory context. Some units of government, 
such as the Center for Disease Control, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, and U.S. military, have long capitalized on 
this new affordance.239 Many other units have largely ignored it.240  
 
We do not predict that technology will somehow overcome all of the 
limitations of the root method that Linblom identifies. For example, 
machines may be no better than officials at ascertaining unregistered 
citizens preferences. And machines rely upon people to choose their inputs 
and goals.241 Computer models can enshrine deeply problematic 
assumptions into policy while harboring pretensions of impartiality. 
Science, technology, and society scholar Kevin Baker offers the example of 
SimCity, a software-based game that came to inform urban planning.242 
SimCity looked open-ended but in fact embedded the assumptions of the 
libertarian Jay Forrester in Urban Dynamics that growth should come at all 
costs and nearly all government interventions in the market backfire.243 
 
Over time, however, administrators may increasingly learn to model 
through instead of muddling forward. Meanwhile, unlike the reflexive 
automation of benefits through software, the generation of complex models 
of specific industries and spheres of life continues to require expertise in 
those contexts. Agency officials that model through are still making the 
ultimate decision about whether and when to intervene in humans’ lives and 
environments. Alternatively, we might conceive of an interdisciplinary 
body to act as a repository for knowledge about modeling itself that can 
lend technical assistance across government.244 
 
In endorsing agency deployment of new technological affordances to 
meet a more stringent standard of public administration and service, we 
acknowledge various limitations. Most notably, it seems non-trivial to draw 
defensible lines between offensive and inefficient automation on the one 
hand, and other, beneficial uses of new affordances that further legitimacy 
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on the other. Although an inaccurate model of the world is not self-
executing in the same way as a benefits algorithm, agencies could succumb 
to well-evidenced automation bias and over-rely on faulty computer 
conclusions in predicting the effects of intervention.245  
 
We are keenly aware of the limitations of the affordances we explore, 
limitations that have often inured to the detriment of the most vulnerable. 
As agencies turn algorithmic tools inward to gain awareness of concerning 
practices by police or other officials, there is a danger they will 
disproportionately identify people of color as candidates for intervention 
just as the use of “heat maps” lead disproportionately to police encounters 
with innocent people of color.246 As Charles Reich warned more than fifty 
years ago, systematization of data collection and surveillance in the 
administrative state inevitably exacted profound costs to the poor and 
marginalized.247 
 
We are also aware that even mere automation can have benefits. In 
theory, by automating menial tasks agencies could free up resources and 
personnel to deal with the needs of the public on a more individualized 
basis. There is a reason that administrative, civil, criminal, and even 
constitutional procedure places an emphasis on efficiency. Government 
could create a perfect system for the lucky few that never made any 
errors.248 But then justice would be delayed for, and hence denied, to many 
others.249 In a world of constrained resources, greater efficiency translates 
into greater access.  
 
Our point is more basic. The American administrative state has, to date, 
systemically eroded its legitimacy by adopting technological systems that 
undermine the very qualities that justify agencies to begin with. The proper 
lodestar for adopting new technical tools is not merely that they come with 
a failsafe against trammeling civil liberties. Agencies should look for 
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technical ways to enhance the expertise, discretion, and capacity for 
individualization that justifies committing such significant public power to 
bureaucratic entities in the first place. Even apart from justification, the 
literature should consider whether the new software and algorithms 
available to agencies should ratchet up societal expectations. Today’s 




At various points in American history, scholars, lawmakers, and courts 
have debated the legitimacy of the administrative state. Arguably at odds 
with the tripartite structure of the Constitution, the agencies regulating our 
daily lives have nevertheless been on firm footing for a long time—in 
reverence to their critical role in governing a complex, evolving society. 
More specifically, agencies are said to be repositories of expertise in the 
contexts and people they regulate. They promise more rapid and 
individualized response to evolving conditions. And, in any event, they are 
limited and channeled by safeguards, from their organic statute, to the APA, 
to the courts.  
 
Many state and federal agencies have in recent decades embraced a 
novel mode of operation: automation. Were the present trend to hold, we 
should expect more and more reliance on software and algorithms by 
agencies in carrying out their delegated responsibilities. Already this 
automated administrative state has been shown to be riddled with concerns. 
In particular, legal challenges in state and federal court regarding the denial 
of benefits and rights—from travel to disability—have revealed a pernicious 
pattern of cruel, sometimes bizarre outcomes.  
 
The legal academy has been attentive to these developments, but in a 
particular way. A literature dating back many years explores the pitfalls of 
automation from the perspective of due process and other denials of rights 
and values. There have been wise suggestions to intervene through changes 
to law and the design of systems in order to restore the status quo, displaced 
and disrupted by the introduction of software and algorithms.  
 
Largely missing from this conversation, however, are broader, structural 
critiques of the legitimacy of agencies. As unfolding litigation across the 
country shows, automated systems in the administrative state highlight the 
extent to which agency officials have redelegated their responsibilities to 
third-party systems that are little understood even by their creators. As 
agencies throw away the very qualities that justify their authority, it is fair 
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to begin to question whether and why they retain legitimacy to carry out the 
will of the legislature.  
 
Our answer is not to dismantle the administrative state.  Instead, we 
urge critic thinking about why agencies find themselves in this position—
for example, the chronic lack of resources best laid at the feet of the 
legislature or executive. Nor should agencies abandon tools of the twenty-
first century. Rather, the proper response to a pending legitimacy crisis 
within the administrative state is to furnish a better lodestar for when to 
develop and deploy technology. Agencies should procure new tools if and 
only if they enhance, rather than undermine, agency claims of being better 
situated than the legislature to govern daily life. 
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